Review of Alina Chan’s, “How to Stop a Lab Leak from Starting the Next Pandemic.”

Review of Alina Chan’s, “How to Stop a Lab Leak from Starting the Next Pandemic.”

by Becky McClain

Alina Chan’s framing of the biosafety problem described in her New York Times guest opinion essay is impressive. Unburdened by the politicization and polarization which too many articles about science and safety suffer, Chan lays out succinctly crucial concerns: the dangers of gain-of-function research, the threat it poses, the history and shortcomings of the legal framework surrounding it, and the glaring gaps that still need to be addressed in the US and world-wide to prevent another catastrophe.

Chan boldly acknowledges that, “research with dangerous pathogens… occurs in lower-biosafety laboratories which are far more numerous and difficult to track” (– meaning BL2 laboratories.) She indicates clearly that the industry is, essentially, self-regulating with no single national standard with any legal teeth. She is correct to predict that if we don’t make changes, we will see another catastrophe in the 21^stcentury involving a lab leak.

Bravo!

Building on her analysis, two crucial issues remain in need of attention.

Chan offers that much of biosafety “rests on the judgment and good behavior of individuals”. There is, however, a glaring omission in this statement: namely, that not just individual scientists, but also powerful institutions develop cultures and internal policies designed to protect their liability, usually at the expense of worker and public safety. The culture of biosafety within these organizations often is reckless and wreaks havoc upon those who work in labs and who want to speak out but cannot without threatening their employment. In this way, the public’s safety also is threatened.

Secondly, Chan talks about the term “gain-of-function” as being used politically. The term, however, is itself not political. Rather the term was purposely employed to make it appear arbitrary, so that scientists committed to avoiding regulation of their risky research could proceed via loopholes.

Consequently, Chan’s analysis is a bit short-sighted. She defines ‘gain-of- function” research as experiments “that can make a pathogen more lethal or contagious” which she says should require our attention. Instead, she should have stated that gain-of-function research are experiments “that include any molecular or physiological changes to a pathogen that are designed to enhance the pathogen’s ability–greater than its natural capacity–to enter into, or infect, or cause disease in the cells of insects, animals or humans”.

This latter definition includes Chan’s description of “making a pathogen more lethal or contagious” but also covers other types of gain-of-function research often designated at a BL2+ biosafety level. These pathogens can cause cancer, metabolic, neurological and autoimmune disorders, or release new emerging disease upon a community exposed to a novel lab virus. This, too, can lead to epidemics.

Risky research is not only the lethal and contagious kind. The latter definition eliminates the arbitrary-ness of what gain-of-function research is and would allow regulation of a broader scope of “risky” research for regulatory review.

Chan’s recommendations are very good, only if, however, the policies are able to be implemented upon private industry as well as in academia and government labs in the U.S. It makes no sense in our current environment that private industry, academia and government labs are regulated completely differently when essentially, they are conducting the same research. We need a unified code that regulates all the industries the same. Biosafety regulations should be based on the type of research conducted, and not on the type of institution.

Unfortunately, implementing Chan’s recommendations to make gain-of-function research safer and regulated will be a fierce struggle. The $3 Trillion dollar biotech industry, which has enormous political influence, will create obstacles to such regulations in an effort to secure their privilege to self-regulate and protect trade secrets.

A recommendation would be that all gag orders through confidentiality agreements should be made illegal when it involves any speech concerning biosafety, lab injuries, worker safety or public health and safety. Establishing a channel for whistleblowers through an independent or government agency is fine, as Chan recommends, but still could easily be impacted with conflicts of interests. Freedom of speech protections to scientists, physicians and biotech workers should be a primary feature in regulation of biolabs. Making gag orders illegal should be the first step toward that process.

Alina Chan’s article lays a foundation upon which to build additional safeguards. It gives voice and hope for needed changes to regulate gain-of-function research and, in so doing, protect the public from further catastrophe.

McClain, a former Pfizer molecular biologist, is author of, EXPOSED, and Board Member of Alliance for Humane Biotechnology

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