3 Baltimore Riot Takeaways from New Report

A postmortem report on the Baltimore riots states that the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) needs more clarity in its vision and structure to handle future unrest.

The Police Executive Research Forum, a police research organization that conducts management assessments, released a 79-page report evaluating shortfalls and opportunities evidenced by the unrest, issuing a slew of recommendations for improvement, some of which the department says it has already implemented.

Two paragraphs bolded in the report are worth reprinting in full here, before getting into the evaluation:

“The courage under pressure of countless BPD officers and supervisors should not be lost amid the critiques found in this assessment. Members of the department were asked to do a very difficult job under stressful circumstances with little rest between work assignments, and they performed admirably under these circumstances. Approximately 155 officers were injured during the week of civil unrest and rioting, and many more were involved in intense, high-risk situations. All leave was cancelled on April 25 and from April 27 to May 3, and 12-hour shifts were in place from April 29 to May 3. This left officers and supervisors in some of the most stressful circumstances of their careers with little time to recuperate. Members of the department showed restraint and a remarkable ability to accomplish a difficult job under exceptional circumstances.

“Furthermore, many community members showed support for the police as they attempted to restore order to the city. Community organizations and individuals donated large quantities of food and water to sustain officers who were on duty for long periods of time. Members of the 300 Men March organization acted as a peaceful barrier between protesters and officers on April 28. And community members in some areas worked with the police to protect their neighborhoods from looting. BPD should build on these positive developments in establishing and restoring trust with its communities.”

Here are several takeaways from the report as far as what could be improved:

Planning. The department did not have a sufficient plan in place outlining roles and responsibilities for command staff in the event of a critical incident lasting longer than a day, according to the report.

”For approximately a week before the protests on April 25, the Baltimore Police Department had been developing intelligence that protests were being planned,” the report states. “But BPD did not have an actual [Incident Action Plan] in place for the planned protests that began on April 25, 2015.”

The department used a modified version of a plan it had been following for the past two years, when it should have created a more detailed version specific to this incident, the report states.

Encapsulating the difficulties presented by the lack of foresight was the control room.

The room where leaders were met for briefings on the riot response was designed to hold 30 to 40 people, and had to accommodate 100 during the unrest. It also houses the BPD’s analytical intelligence section. As a result of the congestion, analysts were only able to use two of 10 computers, were unable to hear information clearly and could not document intelligence. The report recommends a separate space for the command center or relocating those who normally work in that space.

Equipment. “BPD helmets and shields were not sturdy enough, cracking when they were hit by rocks thrown by rioters,” according to the report. Officers neither had the appropriate equipment nor were they trained how to use it in the event of riots, the report said. Protective suits and gas masks were suggested.

Communication. The operational plans that were in place proved problematic because “many commanders and most patrol officers were not familiar” with them, the report says. Who was in charge was unclear and so were orders. Initially, officers were told to take a “soft approach” by avoiding making arrests and using standard equipment, which is the national best practice, the report says; however, as things turned violent, officers were not told that it was OK to make arrests and to wear their protective gear. The order “hold the line” meant different things to different people, with some understanding it as an order to stay with officers and not make arrests while others thought it meant to contain the crowd, according to the report. As a general rule during the unrest, BPD commanders prioritized life, property, traffic and restoration of city services in that order, which was not communicated to officers in the field.

The confusion spilled to over to other agencies that had sent officers to help in Baltimore. Agencies providing mutual aid sometimes self-deployed, and requests did not flow through one central channel such as the Maryland Emergency Management Agency. Outside organizations did not have a consistent message regarding their approach to violent citizens. The report recommends creating a liaison through the BPD for mutual aid requests and having a clear vision of the roles agencies will play as well as memos outlining these relationships so they would not require National Guard activation to deploy.

Read the full report below.

Pictured, National Guard and Baltimore Police on Pratt Street on May 2, 2015. Photo Credit: Elizabeth Janney.