Manufacturing Secrecy: A Rebuke of Attorney Christopher Hawkins and Donahue, Tucker & Ciandella

At the center of this controversy is not an abstract legal theory or a technical dispute over records. It is a deliberate set of decisions made by a specific attorney—Christopher Hawkins—and the law firm that stands behind him, Donahue, Tucker & Ciandella.

This is where accountability begins.

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Attorney Hawkins is not just outside counsel. He is also the Town Moderator for Newmarket—a dual role that carries heightened responsibility, not less. He is uniquely positioned to understand both the legal obligations of the municipality and the democratic principles those laws are meant to protect.

And yet, despite that position—and despite decades of clear law—he participated in, defended, and aggressively enforced a settlement agreement that strikes directly at the core of New Hampshire’s Right-to-Know Law, RSA 91-A.

That is not a gray area. It is a failure of legal judgment.

RSA 91-A is unequivocal. It mandates the “greatest possible public access” to government records. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has reinforced this repeatedly, holding that access depends on the nature of the record—not the identity or motive of the requester. This principle exists to prevent exactly what happened here: selective denial of records based on who is asking or why.

Any municipal attorney knows this.

Or should.

Because the law goes even further. It does not merely require disclosure—it forbids government from creating mechanisms to evade disclosure. Municipalities cannot contract around statutory obligations. They cannot create private agreements that suppress public rights. They cannot penalize citizens for exercising those rights in the future.

Yet that is precisely what Attorney Hawkins helped put into motion.

The settlement agreement at issue attempted to do something fundamentally unlawful: restrict a citizen’s future ability to make Right-to-Know requests. That is not just aggressive lawyering—it is a direct conflict with established law. The right to access public records is not a private bargaining chip. It is a public right, held collectively by all citizens. As such, it cannot be waived, sold, or extinguished through contract.

This is basic doctrine.

Under long-standing principles of municipal law, towns like Newmarket possess only those powers expressly granted by statute or necessarily implied. There is no statute in New Hampshire—none—that authorizes a municipality to enter into an agreement restricting a citizen’s statutory rights under RSA 91-A. Such agreements are ultra vires—beyond the town’s authority—and therefore void.

Attorney Hawkins knew this. Or, at a minimum, should have known it.

Because this is not obscure law. It is foundational.

And yet, instead of advising the Town against entering into such an agreement, he and his firm drafted it. Instead of acknowledging its legal defects when challenged, they defended it. And most troubling of all, they pursued attorney’s fees to enforce it—doubling down on a position that undermines the very statute they are obligated to respect.

That is not zealous advocacy. That is institutional overreach backed by public money.

The implications are profound. If attorneys like Christopher Hawkins can craft and enforce agreements that restrict access to public records, then RSA 91-A becomes optional in practice. Municipalities could:

• Pay citizens to withdraw or limit requests
• Silence critics through financial pressure
• Avoid scrutiny by contract rather than compliance
• Weaponize attorney’s fees to deter future transparency efforts

This is not speculation. It is the logical outcome of what has already occurred.

It also directly collides with established precedent. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has made clear that:

• The motive of a requester is irrelevant
• Public records, once subject to disclosure, must be available to all
• Access cannot be conditioned on identity, intent, or consequence

By supporting and enforcing an agreement that punishes or restricts a requester based on perceived intent, Attorney Hawkins effectively attempted to create a motive-based barrier to access—something the law explicitly forbids.

Attorneys are not merely advocates. They are officers of the court, bound by ethical obligations that include respect for the law and the rights it protects. When a municipal attorney participates in undermining statutory rights, it does not just affect one individual—it distorts the legal framework for everyone.

And that is the real issue here.

This is not about one request, one agreement, or one case. It is about whether public rights in New Hampshire can be quietly negotiated away behind closed doors—crafted by experienced counsel, approved through questionable processes, and enforced through the courts.

If the answer is yes, then RSA 91-A is no longer a guarantee of transparency. It is a suggestion.

Attorney Christopher Hawkins had both the knowledge and the responsibility to prevent that outcome. Instead, he became central to it.

That deserves scrutiny.
That demands accountability.
And it raises a question that should concern every citizen:

If those entrusted to uphold the law are willing to work around it, who is left to enforce it?