Christopher Hawkins Told the New Hampshire Supreme Court “No Records.” The Record Says Otherwise.

When a municipal attorney stands before the New Hampshire Supreme Court and represents that no records exist, that statement carries weight. It is not advocacy in the ordinary sense—it is a representation of fact to the highest court in the state. And when that statement is wrong, it is not a minor error. It goes to the integrity of the judicial process itself.

That is exactly the problem facing Christopher Hawkins.

Because the position advanced on behalf of the Town of Newmarket—that there were no records—cannot be reconciled with what the record actually shows.

In the underlying proceedings, the formation of the settlement agreement was not described as passive or administrative. It was described as active, deliberate, and conducted through communications among Town officials. As reflected in the hearing:

The Town Manager “admitted they discussed, deliberated, and voted… through emails… outside of any public record.”

That statement is not ambiguous. It describes deliberation and decision-making through email. And that matters because under RSA 91-A, when a public body conducts business—discussion, deliberation, or decision-making—those communications are public records.

You cannot deliberate by email and simultaneously claim that no records exist. That is not a close legal question. That is a factual impossibility.

The Town attempted to avoid this problem by claiming that any such emails were protected by attorney-client privilege. That argument does not withstand scrutiny. Privilege protects legal advice. It does not transform public decision-making into confidential communication. It does not shield policy discussions. It does not cover votes. And it certainly does not erase the existence of records altogether.

Even the Town’s own briefing acknowledges that communications occurred between Town officials and counsel in connection with the agreement. What it attempts to do is relabel those communications as privileged and therefore beyond disclosure. But privilege is not a magic wand. It does not allow a municipality to conduct public business in secret and then deny that records exist.

That is where the issue becomes serious.

Because the representation to the New Hampshire Supreme Court was not that records existed but were exempt. It was that no records existed.

That is an entirely different statement.

Christopher Hawkins is an experienced municipal attorney. He knows—or is expected to know—the difference between:

• records that exist but are claimed to be exempt, and
• records that do not exist at all

He knows that if Town officials discussed, deliberated, and reached agreement through email, those emails exist. He knows they are subject to RSA 91-A unless a valid exemption applies. And he knows that labeling them as privileged does not make them disappear.

Yet the position advanced to the Court was “no records.”

That is not aggressive advocacy. That is a representation that the underlying facts do not support.

And it raises a question that cannot be ignored:

How does a municipal attorney tell the New Hampshire Supreme Court that no records exist when the formation of the agreement itself required the very emails being withheld?

This is not about nuance. It is not about interpreting a gray area of the law. It is about a direct contradiction between what happened and what was said.

If Town officials:

• discussed the agreement
• deliberated on its terms
• and approved it through email communications

then records exist. Period.

If those records were withheld under a claim of privilege that does not apply, that is a violation of RSA 91-A.

And if, despite knowing this, the Court was told that no records exist, the issue escalates beyond a Right-to-Know dispute.

Under RSA 641:7, knowingly concealing or withholding documents to impair their availability in an official proceeding is not a civil matter. It is a criminal one.

That is the gravity of what is at stake.

This is not about whether the settlement agreement should be enforced. It is not about whether a waiver is valid. It is not even about whether the Town violated RSA 91-A in the first instance.

It is about whether the Court was given a truthful account of the facts.

Because once a court is told that records do not exist—when they do—the entire proceeding is built on a false premise.

And that is not something that can be explained away as litigation strategy.

It is something that demands accountability.

The question for Christopher Hawkins is no longer whether the Town can defend its actions.

The question is whether he can defend the accuracy of what was said to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

Because the record already has its answer.