New Hampshire’s Right-to-Know Law, RSA 91-A, exists to prevent secret government.

When Judges Decide Transparency Violations Don’t Matter: Judge Andrew Schulman and the Supreme Court’s Seal of Approval

New Hampshire’s Right-to-Know Law, RSA 91-A, exists to prevent secret government. It promises citizens that when public officials act behind closed doors, courts will demand accountability.

In my case against the Town of Newmarket, Judge Andrew R. Schulman did the opposite—and the New Hampshire Supreme Court approved his reasoning as “well-reasoned.”

That approval should terrify anyone who still believes transparency laws are real.

The Court Admitted the Facts Were Disputed—Then Refused to Hear Them

Judge Schulman acknowledged that there were genuine disputes of fact about whether Newmarket officials violated RSA 91-A through informal, undocumented deliberations. That admission should have triggered a hearing on the merits—the very mechanism the statute exists to provide.

Instead, Judge Schulman announced something extraordinary: even if those violations were proven, he would not grant a remedy.

Once a judge declares in advance that violations of transparency law will carry no consequence, hearings become a sham. Evidence becomes irrelevant. The law becomes meaningless.

Summary Judgment as a Weapon Against Transparency

RSA 91-A cases are inherently fact-driven. They involve questions of who met, who communicated, what was discussed, and whether the public was unlawfully excluded. These are not abstract legal questions. They are factual ones.

Yet Judge Schulman used summary judgment—a tool meant for cases with no material factual disputes—to avoid hearing evidence in a case where he expressly acknowledged disputed facts.

That is not judicial efficiency. That is judicial avoidance.

The Most Dangerous Holding: Violations Without Consequences

Judge Schulman wrote that even if RSA 91-A violations were established, he would not invalidate the government’s action. The statute says a court may invalidate actions taken in violation of the law. Judge Schulman transformed that discretion into categorical immunity for government misconduct.

Worse still, the New Hampshire Supreme Court endorsed this reasoning, labeling it “well-reasoned.”

That endorsement sends a devastating message:
Transparency laws may exist, but enforcement is optional—and courts may decide in advance not to enforce them at all.

This Is Not Neutral Judging—It Is Institutional Protection

Judge Schulman resolved issues of:

• prejudice,
• public harm,
• intent, and
• credibility

without testimony, without cross-examination, and without fact-finding—while crediting the Town’s narrative and denying the citizen a forum to challenge it.

When courts protect government actors by refusing to hear evidence of secrecy, they are no longer neutral arbiters. They become institutional shields.

If This Can Happen in a Transparency Case, What About Criminal Cases?

This is the question no one wants to confront.

If a judge can:

• acknowledge disputed facts,
• refuse to hear them,
• and deny remedies in advance—

and if the state’s highest court calls that “well-reasoned,” what confidence should the public have that the same judiciary will be fearless when liberty, due process, or criminal justice is at stake?

A judiciary willing to neutralize transparency law for convenience or institutional comfort is not suddenly rigorous when the consequences are greater.

Justice is not situational. Either the law constrains power—or it does not.

The Chilling Signal to Government Officials

Judge Schulman’s ruling, blessed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, tells public officials:

You may deliberate in secret. You may avoid records. And even if someone proves it, courts may decide it doesn’t matter.

That is not open government. That is managed opacity—sanctioned from the bench.

This Is Bigger Than One Case

This is not about my loss. It is about the judiciary’s role in preserving—or dismantling—public trust.

A transparency law that courts refuse to enforce is worse than no law at all. It creates the illusion of accountability while quietly disabling it.

When judges decide they will not hear evidence of secrecy—and appellate courts praise that decision—the public is not being protected.

It is being managed.