Open Letter to Judge Andrew Schulman

Judge Andrew Schulman,

I write this letter publicly and deliberately. Not as a personal attack, but as a necessary record of what occurred in your courtroom—and what your decisions have done to me, to the courts of New Hampshire, to the Office of the Attorney General, and to the public’s confidence in transparent government.

This letter concerns two cases involving the Town of Newmarket:
one Right-to-Know (RSA 91-A) enforcement case, and
one breach-of-contract case arising from a settlement agreement whose legality was squarely disputed.

Although the cases involved different causes of action, your handling of both reveals the same disturbing pattern: you abandoned statutory law and binding precedent in order to reach an outcome you believed would “end a feud” that did not exist. In doing so, you authorized secret government, validated an unlawfully procured contract, and punished a citizen for insisting that the law be followed.

What I Actually Did

What I did was simple.
I reported that there were no public minutes and no nonpublic minutes showing that the Town of Newmarket had ever approved the settlement agreement at issue. I alleged—accurately—that the Town Council never discussed, deliberated, or voted to approve the contract in a lawful meeting, as required by law. I further stated that I did not wish to be bound by, or participate in, a contract that was unlawfully procured.
That is not harassment.
That is not bad faith.
That is not frivolous litigation.
That is a citizen invoking the Right-to-Know Law and objecting to secret government action.

The Right-to-Know Case: You Authorized Secret Government

In the RSA 91-A case, your comments and rulings went far beyond error. You accepted—and endorsed—the proposition that a public body may discuss, deliberate, and approve a public agreement outside of any lawful public meeting, and that even if this occurred, the agreement would remain valid.
You further ruled that:

• the absence of public deliberation and voting did not invalidate the agreement, and
• neither I nor the public could prove we were “prejudiced” by being excluded.

That reasoning rewrites RSA 91-A out of existence.
The Right-to-Know Law does not require proof of individualized prejudice. It is a structural statute, enacted because secrecy itself is the harm. The Legislature determined that when government acts in secret, the public is injured as a matter of law.
By imposing a prejudice requirement found nowhere in the statute, you:

• shifted the burden of transparency from the government to the citizen,
• required proof of facts concealed by the violation itself,
• and rendered enforcement of RSA 91-A practically impossible.

A transparency statute that requires citizens to prove harm caused by secrecy is no transparency statute at all.

Ratification: A Doctrine You Invented Where the Law Forbids It

You compounded this error by declaring that even if the agreement was never lawfully approved, it could nevertheless be ratified—including through later conduct such as bringing suit upon it.
That conclusion directly contradicts settled New Hampshire law.
Public bodies possess only the authority granted by the Legislature, exercised in the manner the Legislature prescribes. Where the law requires approval in a public meeting, there is no alternative path. An agreement reached outside that process is not merely defective—it is void.
A void act cannot be ratified. Ratification would itself require the same lawful public approval that never occurred.
By holding otherwise, you created a rule under which:

• statutory meeting requirements can be ignored,
• secret approval can be cured after the fact,
• and courts will enforce the result so long as secrecy succeeds.

That doctrine has no basis in New Hampshire law.

Public Policy: You Declared the Indefensible Enforceable

You further concluded that this agreement—reached without lawful approval and used to restrict statutory and constitutional rights—did not violate public policy.
That conclusion is irreconcilable with New Hampshire precedent.
Courts have repeatedly held that:

• public bodies may not bargain away statutory duties,
• agreements that frustrate legislative purpose are void as against public policy,
• and courts must refuse enforcement even if the parties consent.

RSA 91-A embodies one of the strongest public policies in New Hampshire law: that government transparency is non-negotiable. An agreement that insulates public officials from accountability and validates secret decision-making violates that policy on its face.

The Breach-of-Contract Case: Enforcing an Unlawful Agreement

In the breach-of-contract case, you enforced—and relied upon—the same unlawfully procured agreement, despite:

• the absence of Town Council approval,
• the absence of a lawful public vote,
• and evidence that the officials involved lacked authority to bind the Town.

Rather than require proof of lawful authorization, you excused its absence. Rather than invalidate an ultra vires contract, you enforced it. In doing so, you elevated expediency over law and substituted your judgment for that of the Legislature.

The Attorney-Fee Award: Punishment for Transparency

The most damaging consequence of your rulings came next.
After I reported the absence of public records, objected to secret approval, and refused to be bound by an unlawfully procured contract, you awarded the Town of Newmarket approximately fifteen thousand dollars in attorney’s fees against me.
In plain terms, the court punished a citizen for:

• reporting that no lawful approval existed,
• invoking the Right-to-Know Law,
• and insisting that government follow the law.

That outcome turns RSA 91-A on its head.
Under your ruling, a citizen who discovers secret government action is no longer protected—he is exposed. He is deterred. He is made an example of.
The message to the public is unmistakable:
do not question whether your government followed the law—because if it did not, the courts may punish you for noticing.

A Chilling Message to Pro Se Litigants

Taken together, your decisions convey a dangerous principle: that pro se litigants who persist, cite precedent, and refuse to acquiesce to unlawful outcomes may be punished—not by law, but by judicial discretion untethered from it.
Judges swear an oath to apply the law without favor, fear, or prejudice. That oath does not contain an exception for unrepresented citizens, nor does it permit courts to deter lawful litigation through financial coercion.

The Broader Harm

Your rulings have:

• undermined public confidence in the judiciary,
• weakened enforcement of New Hampshire’s Right-to-Know Law,
• placed the Attorney General’s Office in the untenable position of defending outcomes contrary to settled law,
• and emboldened public bodies to operate in secrecy, confident that courts may later excuse the violation.

This harm extends far beyond one litigant. It strikes at the foundation of transparent, accountable government.

Conclusion

Courts do not exist to end disputes by any means necessary. They exist to apply the law faithfully—even when doing so is inconvenient.
By authorizing secret government, inventing ratification where the law forbids it, enforcing an agreement contrary to public policy, and punishing a citizen for reporting the absence of public records, you failed in that duty.
This letter exists so the record is clear—not only as to what happened to me, but as to what your decisions have done to the rule of law in New Hampshire.
Respectfully,
Jeffrey Thomas Clay
Citizen and Litigant