Response to the Town of Epping's Frivolous Lawsuit

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS. SUPERIOR COURT

Town of EPPING

v.

Jeffrey T. Clay

Docket No. 218-2024-CV-00094

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF STANDING

NOW COMES Defendant Jeffrey Thomas Clay and respectfully Motions this Honorable Court to Dismiss, with Prejudice, the Town of Epping’s Petition for Declaratory Judgement and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction for Lack of Standing. In support of this Motion, Defendant Jeffrey Thomas Clay states as follows:
SUMMARY
The plaintiff has not suffered a legal injury which the law was designed to protect and the plaintiff has not shown that it is in danger of irreparable harm. The claims alleged are hypothetical and not concrete and the Petitioner is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Moreover, the harm it describes is the legal duty placed upon it to ensure transparency.
The purpose of Right-to-Know is to ensure both the greatest possible public access to the actions, discussions, and records of all public bodies and their accountability to the people. This law is not designed to hold private citizens accountable.
The filing of this Petition by Epping was done so with malicious intent by their legal counsel for the sole purpose of abusing and defaming Defendant who is currently involved in two separate litigations with his law firm in which Defendant has alleged his colleagues engaged in criminal acts. It was also filed apparently without the Town of Epping Board of Selectmen's arrival, as there are no public or non-public minutes of any such approval.
In bringing this case, the legal counsel shared his extensive knowledge of the Defendant’s previous lawsuits involving Newmarket. As this Court will see, the issues raised in this complaint have already been dismissed by Judge St. Hilaire and the legal counsel for Epping knew or should have known what the Court stated.

FACTS
1. Epping’s Petition is meritless, frivolous, unjust, vexatious, wanton, oppressive, and ignores the decision of Judge Daniel I. St. Hilaire in Newmarket School District v. Jeffrey Thomas Clay, Docket No.: 218-2021-CV-939, issued on 05/04/2022 which, given the Petitioner's extensive knowledge of lawsuits involving the Defendant, Petitioner was clearly aware of. Moreover, the Petition was filed to harass, intimidate, and abuse the Defendant and to bias the Court against the Defendant in other lawsuits currently before the Court.
2. The Town of Epping asks this Court for a Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction against the Defendant under NH RSA 91-A: 8, alleging Defendant made Right-to-Knpw requests to Epping in bad faith, were frivolous, unjust, vexatious, wanton, and oppressive.
3. NH RSA 91-A:8, I (2013) provides that public bodies, agencies, or officials who violate the provisions of this chapter shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in a lawsuit under the chapter, provided that the court finds the lawsuit was "necessary in order to enforce compliance with the provisions of this chapter or to address a purposeful violation of this chapter." RSA 91-A: 8 does not apply to citizens.
3. In bringing this lawsuit, Epping enumerated seven previous lawsuits involving the Defendant, omitting the decision of Judge Daniel I. St. Hilaire in Newmarket School District v. Jeffrey Thomas Clay, Docket No.: 218-2021-CV-939, issued on 05/04/2022. This omission was not by accident. Judge Hilaire has already addressed the same issues now complained of by Epping and dismissed the case.
4. Judge St. Hillaire, in dismissing Newmarkets’ Petition for Declaratory Judgement and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, which, like Epping’s, concerned NH Right-to-Know Laws, stated the following in his order:
A. “Under the existing statutory scheme, the Court does not have the discretion or the authority to limit a particular individual’s ability to seek records under RSA 91-A. See Minuteman, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 147 N.H. 634, 641–42 (2002) (recognizing that “matters of public policy . . . are reserved for the legislature”); see generally Petition of Malisos, 166 N.H. 726, 729 (2014) (“We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.”).”
B. “it does not stand to reason that the plaintiff can shift its responsibility to the judiciary by requesting that it act as a gatekeeper to screen those requests.”
C. “the public interest will be adversely affected if the 7 Court issues the injunction requested. “Openness in the conduct of public business is essential to a democratic society. The purpose of this chapter is to ensure both the greatest possible public access to the actions, discussions and records of all public bodies, and their accountability to the people.” RSA 91-A:1.”
D. “ In sum, the plaintiff has not shown that it is in immediate danger of irreparable harm. Indeed, the harm it describes is the legal duty placed upon it to ensure transparency. Even still, remedies at law exist, as described in that statute. They include the allowance for notification that it will take time to compile the information, the charging of actual costs of providing copies, and the denial of requests that are exempt under the statute.”
E. “Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has a hostile intent toward the district due to his termination as a district employee in 2009. See Complaint ¶ 9. However, “[t]he requester’s motives in seeking disclosure are irrelevant to the question of access.” Censabella v. Hillsborough County Atty., 171 N.H. 424, 427 (cleaned up).”
4. As Newmarket did in filing their petition, Epping was rushing to the courthouse before any lawsuit was filed against them regarding the Right-to-Know requests made by Clay. Making matters worse for Epping, the Town admits in its pleading to this Court that the Town agreed to provide all of the non-exempt to the Defendant; Yet they filed the lawsuit anyway.
5. Respectfully, Petitioner’s lawsuit abuses the law and needlessly wastes Court resources and taxpayer funds for unnecessary legal fees.
6. The tactics employed by Epping in filing this lawsuit are disgraceful, harmful, and hurtful and should be rebuked by the Court in the strongest terms.

Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss;
2. Find the Petitioner Town of Epping acted in bad faith in bringing this Petition;
3. Issue sanctions against Petitioner and legal counsel;
4. Order Town officials to personally reimburse the Town for all costs associated with bringing this lawsuit;
5. Award the Defendant damages for the abuses inflicted upon him by Epping.
6. Grant such further relief as is necessary and just.

Respectfully submitted.
/s/ Jeffrey Thomas Clay
31481 Cannon Rush Drive
San Antonio Fl, 33576
603-534-1963
jeffreytclay@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date the forgoing was served on counsel and parties of record via the Court’s electronic filing and service system.

s/ Jeffrey Thomas Clay
31481 Cannon Rush Drive
San Antonio Fl, 33576
603-534-1963
jeffreytclay@gmail.com