Silence at Counsel Table: How Attorney Briana Matuszko and DTC Manufactured an Appellate Record

SILENCE AT COUNSEL TABLE: HOW ATTORNEY BRIANA MATUSZKO AND DTC MANUFACTURED AN APPELLATE RECORD

An Investigative Examination of Professional Ethics, Misleading Filings, and Duty of Candor Violations in Town of Newmarket v. Jeffrey Clay

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under Rule 3.3 of the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney owes an absolute, non-negotiable duty of candor to the tribunal. A lawyer is strictly prohibited from knowingly making false statements of material fact, offering false evidence, or allowing a false factual premise to stand uncorrected before a judge.

In the consolidated litigation involving Town of Newmarket v. Jeffrey Clay, outside legal counsel Donahue, Tucker & Ciandella, PLLC (DTC)—specifically lead appellate attorney Briana L. Matuszko—faced a critical juncture. After witnessing her co-counsel confess under oath during live trial testimony that municipal officials had conducted an illegal, off-the-books email consensus loop, Matuszko did not correct the record. Instead, she drafted, signed, and submitted formal briefs to both the Rockingham County Superior Court and the New Hampshire Supreme Court that systematically scrubbed that live trial confession from the written record while misrepresenting the express legal limits of the Newmarket Town Charter.

By advancing a series of shifting, mutually exclusive factual claims, Matuszko and DTC successfully secured and protected an extortionate $38,444.57 fee judgment derived from a manufactured factual foundation.

I. THE CHARTER RESTRICTION: WHAT MATUSZKO KNEW ABOUT EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Central to Matuszko’s legal strategy was convincing the courts that Town Manager Steve Fournier possessed independent legal authority to execute the settlement agreement without Town Council approval. However, Matuszko—as municipal counsel specializing in local government law—was fully aware of the express statutory and charter limitations governing municipal managers:

• NH RSA 37:6, VII(j) & Town Charter Limits: Under state law and Section 3.02(h)(10) of the Newmarket Town Charter, a Town Manager’s contracting power is strictly restricted to "the letting, making, and performance of all contracts for work done for the town."
• The Legal Impossibility: Settling a Right-to-Know dispute or paying a citizen to waive statutory access rights is not a contract for "work done for the town." Because Jeffrey Clay never performed work or provided services for Newmarket, Fournier possessed zero independent authority under the Charter to execute the settlement.
• The Necessity of Council Approval: Matuszko knew that because the Town Manager lacked independent authority under the Charter, the contract could only be legally authorized by a formal vote of the Town Council in an open public meeting.

To hide the fact that the Town Manager acted outside his Charter authority, Matuszko constructed a false legal defense: conflating routine $45,000 municipal purchasing bylaws with specialized contracting powers, while simultaneously trying to cover up the Council's illegal email loop.

II. THE LIVE CONFESSION: WHAT MATUSZKO HEARD AT COUNSEL TABLE

On March 28, 2024, during a consolidated hearing in Rockingham County Superior Court, Attorney Briana Matuszko sat at counsel table alongside DTC Lead Counsel John J. Ratigan. Under direct questioning on the record, Ratigan made a series of crucial admissions under oath (Transcript, pp. 40–46):

1. No Council Consultation: Ratigan admitted he never met, consulted with, or emailed the members of the Newmarket Town Council.
2. The Middleman: He communicated exclusively with Town Manager Steve Fournier.
3. The Electronic Consensus Loop: Fournier then exchanged emails with individual Town Councilors behind closed doors to secure an informal "thumbs up" and approve the settlement agreement outside of any publicly noticed meeting.

This live testimony under oath dismantled previous sworn affidavits submitted by Town Manager Steve Fournier, which had certified under penalty of perjury that no such email deliberations or consensus-building had occurred.

Attorney Matuszko was physically present. She heard the sworn confession. She knew the Town Charter gave Fournier no independent authority, making the secret email loop the only source of the agreement's execution. Yet, what she wrote in subsequent court filings directly contradicted the truth revealed on the record.

III. THE TRIAL BRIEF: SANITIZING THE SUPERIOR COURT RECORD

Just days after hearing Ratigan’s live testimony, Attorney Briana Matuszko submitted the Town’s Post-Hearing Brief on April 8, 2024. Rather than acknowledging the serial email loop admitted by her co-counsel, Matuszko manufactured a sanitized version of events:

• Sanitizing Open Meeting Violations: Matuszko wrote on page 6 that "there was no meeting held between members of the Town Council, or members of Town Council and Town legal counsel, related to the Agreement." By framing the event as a complete non-occurrence, she concealed the un-notified serial email meeting from Judge Andrew Schulman.
• Manufacturing Dual Authority: On pages 6–7, Matuszko argued that the Town Manager possessed independent contracting authority under $45,000, while simultaneously claiming he was "duly authorized by the Town Council." She knew this was a legal falsehood—the Charter restricted the Manager to "work done for the town," and the Council's "authorization" derived strictly from the secret, illegal email loop.
• Misusing Legal Privilege: Matuszko asserted that "any emails exchanged between members of the Town Council and Town legal counsel are permissible and are records protected under the attorney-client privilege." This was factually false; Ratigan had just admitted he never emailed the Council. The emails were between the Town Manager and the Council to bypass public meeting laws—a practice explicitly illegal under Ettinger v. Town of Madison.

IV. THE APPELLATE BRIEF: DECEIVING THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

When the case reached the New Hampshire Supreme Court (Case No. 2024-0474), Attorney Briana Matuszko doubled down. In the Response Brief of the Respondent, filed March 3, 2025, Matuszko presented the Justices with a series of irreconcilable representations:

In Section I.C (page 13), Matuszko asserted to the Supreme Court:

"The Town Council never held a meeting, nor did they meet with Town legal counsel, to discuss or approve the Agreement... The Town Manager was duly authorized by the Town Council to sign the Agreement on behalf of the Town."

She completely omitted Ratigan’s sworn trial admissions and ignored the Charter's express statutory restriction, presenting the appeal as if the Town Manager had valid legal authority and the Town Council had never engaged in off-the-books email deliberations.

In the Summary of Argument and Section I.D (pages 9, 14–15), Matuszko made mutually exclusive claims:

• She claimed that "there were no emails between the Town Manager and the Town Council related to the Agreement."
• She claimed that "no part of the Town's actions resulted in the creation of documents subject to the Right-to-Know law."
• She simultaneously argued that communications between the Council and counsel were "exempt from disclosure pursuant to RSA 91-A:5, XII."

Matuszko asked the Supreme Court to believe two contradictory premises: that no emails ever existed, but that if they did exist, they were immune from public inspection under attorney-client privilege.

In Section III (page 22), Matuszko dismissed claims that the Town violated NH RSA 641:7 (Tampering with Public Records or Information) as a routine disagreement over privileged documents. She concealed from the Justices that the RSA 641:7 allegations were grounded directly in the fact that Town Manager Steve Fournier submitted sworn affidavits certifying no deliberations took place, which were subsequently exposed as false by Ratigan’s live testimony.

V. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND FRAUD UPON THE COURT

When an attorney derived from a firm like Donahue, Tucker & Ciandella, PLLC uses manufactured factual premises and misrepresents charter authority to secure a $38,444.57 monetary award against a citizen litigant, it ceases to be standard advocacy.

Briana Matuszko’s actions directly implicate major ethical and statutory violations:

1. NH Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal): Knowing that her co-counsel admitted to an illegal email consensus loop, and knowing the Town Charter gave the Manager no independent authority, Matuszko had an affirmative duty to state the true facts to the Superior Court and Supreme Court. Instead, she drafted filings that actively concealed the confession and misrepresented municipal authority.
2. NH RSA 641:3 (Unsworn Falsification): Submitting formal pleadings to state courts containing factual representations known to be contradicted by live trial testimony and express charter provisions.
3. Fraud Upon the Court: Procuring a binding judicial order and fee judgment by intentionally misleading the tribunal regarding the underlying evidentiary record and municipal legal powers.

CONCLUSION

The official record demonstrates that DTC Attorney Briana L. Matuszko did not merely represent a municipal client—she actively engineered a manufactured appellate record. Knowing the Town Charter restricted the Town Manager strictly to contracts for "work done for the town," and standing beside John Ratigan as he confessed to an off-the-books email loop, Matuszko chose to write briefs claiming those emails did not exist, that no deliberations occurred, and that the Town Manager possessed lawful authority.

Her conduct represents a severe breakdown in professional ethics and a deliberate subversion of the judicial process. For justice to be served, Attorney Briana Matuszko and the firm of Donahue, Tucker & Ciandella must face formal accountability before the New Hampshire Attorney Discipline System and law enforcement authorities investigating public records tampering and fraud upon the court.